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The Ideology of Legal Interpretation 
Sara C. Benesh∗ 
Jason J. Czarnezki∗∗ 
INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars and political scientists often disagree over the 
degree to which legal interpretive strategies might, at least in part, 
drive judicial decision-making. In other words, when a judge uses 
“originalism” to interpret the Constitution, does she do so because 
she truly adheres to that strategy and finds its result determinative, or 
does she do so as a means to an ideological end? Political scientists 
most often consider “the law,” as measured by case facts or precedent 
or invocations of the intent of the framers, mere “window dressing” 
that provides cover for judges to vote in accordance with their 
preferred policy outcome. Legal scholars, more often than political 
scientists, attribute decisions to legal analysis.1  
But it is difficult to separate the influence of the legal and the 
attitudinal, due to the conflation of legal and ideological preferences. 
For example, political scientists Sara Benesh and Harold Spaeth 
argue that, in order to model the role of law on dissenting behavior on 
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helpful comments. All errors, of course, remain our own. 
 1. See, e.g., HAROLD J. SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY 
WILL: ADHERENCE TO PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999); Jason J. Czarnezki & 
William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation, 
65 MD. L. REV. 841 (2006); Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court 
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. R. 323 (1992); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, A 
Preference for Deference? The Supreme Court and Judicial Review, 57 POL. RES. Q. 131 
(2004); Robert M. Howard & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Original Look at Originalism, 36 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 113 (2002). 
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the Supreme Court, one could examine the extent to which Justices 
disagree over “what the case is about” rather than how best to resolve 
the case.2 In order to tap into that consideration, they look at factors 
such as legal provision, issue, authority for decision, declaration of 
unconstitutionality, and alteration of precedent. But might these 
factors be driven by ideological concerns? In other words, might 
strategic justices frame cases in ways that best suit their preferred 
outcome? Or might liberal and conservative justices see cases 
differently? This Article focuses on these possibilities by testing for 
ideological components in two modes of legal interpretation—
originalism and legislative history—for judges of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Are these legal devices used in 
pursuit of policy or are they instead determinative (at least partially) 
of outcomes? Justice Scalia remains, of course, the most famous 
proponent of originalism.3 Is it a coincidence that he is also one of the 
most conservative members of the Supreme Court? Justice Breyer 
suggests that one should interpret the Constitution in light of its 
democratic aims and champions the use of legislative history to enact 
the will of the people.4 Is it a coincidence that he is one of the more 
liberal Justices?  
This Article questions whether consistency in legal interpretation 
is truly a manifestation of the influence of law or instead a means to a 
preferred policy end. Part I of this Article discusses the legal 
interpretive tools of originalism and legislative history and how they 
might influence outcomes in cases. Part II discusses judicial decision-
making in the U.S. Courts of Appeals and justifies their use in the 
analysis. Parts III and IV offer information on our data and 
methodology, as well as a discussion of the results. Finally, in Part V, 
we find that the use of legal interpretive strategies are indeed, at least 
in part, ideologically-driven, though not in a straightforward way. We 
conclude that arguments suggesting that legal interpretation is 
 
 2. Sara C. Benesh & Harold Spaeth, The Constraint of Law: A Study of Supreme Court 
Dissensus, 35 AM. POL. RES. 755 (2007). 
 3. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 4. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005). 
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determinative and hence alleviates room for attitudinally-motivated 
outcomes are over stated. 
I. LEGAL INTERPRETATION 
“Making sense of legal interpretation in theory is not the same as 
making sense of it in practice.”5 There are few points of agreement in 
the debate over legal interpretation. However, most judges and 
scholars agree that the text of the statute or constitutional provision is 
the starting point.6 In addition, judges and legal academics accept that 
courts will rely heavily on their previous decisions interpreting the 
statute or constitutional provision in question. Beyond the text and 
precedent, however, considerable disagreement exists over the 
appropriate tools with which to derive a statute’s or constitutional 
provision’s meaning.7  
Consider, for example, the relationship between a commitment to 
originalism and an acceptance of legislative history. If a judge desires 
to know the original meaning of any legal document, he or she might 
find both originalist documents and legislative history attractive. Yet, 
some judges embrace originalism but shy away from the potentially 
unwieldy documents of legislative history in an effort to promote 
legal interpretation that is more rule-bound and formal.8 (An 
argument can be quite forcefully made, though, that the legal history 
surrounding the drafting of the Constitution is equally cumbersome.) 
Similarly, a judge may dislike legislative history either because the 
judge is non-originalist (i.e., has no interest in the intent of the 
drafter), or because the judge is a formalist preferring rules over 
 
 5. Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 1, at 853. 
 6. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 513–879 (2d ed. 1995); 
Bluewater Network v. EPA, 370 F.3d 1, 13 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“We begin our interpretation of 
the provision with the assumption that legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary meaning 
of the words used.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 7. See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984); 
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities 
for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995).  
 8. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 173–75 (1996) 
(discussing “hard originalism” as an attempt to make constitutional and statutory interpretation 
rule-like). 
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standards (i.e., legislative history documents open up far too many 
legal avenues compared to the plain text of the document).9 
Indeed, two current Justices, Scalia and Breyer, disagree mightily 
over how best to make sense of the written words of Congress and 
the Founders. This section focuses on the warring interpretive 
strategies of originalism and legislative history, championed by these 
two Justices as well as by other judges and legal scholars. 
A. Originalism 
Professor Keith Whittington describes “the critical originalist 
directive” as the position that “the Constitution should be interpreted 
according to the understandings made public at the time of the 
drafting and ratification.”10 Justice Scalia believes that a judge who 
subscribes to an originalist view of interpreting a constitutional or 
statutory provision would agree with the following: “Laws mean 
what they actually say, not what legislators intended them to say but 
did not write into the law’s text . . . . [I]t is the original meaning of 
the text . . . that should govern . . . .”11 This is a rule-bound method of 
deciding cases, arguably constraining the applying judge to only 
those interpretations of the Constitution or of a statute that are 
reasonably inferred from the original public understanding of the 
document’s text.12 This means that the substance of a constitutional 
provision might be gleaned via contemporaneous dictionaries or The 
Federalist Papers, as opposed to the notes of James Madison.  
As Justice Scalia recently stated in an address to The Federalist 
Society, “Scalia does have a philosophy, it’s called originalism. 
That’s what prevents him from doing the things he would like to 
 
 9. Cass R. Sunstein, Must Formalism Be Defended Empirically?, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 636, 
638 (1999) (stating that formalists are committed “to promoting compliance with all applicable 
legal formalities (whether or not they make sense in the individual case), to ensuring rule-bound 
law (even if application of the rule, statutory or contractual, makes little sense in the individual 
case), and to constraining the discretion of judges in deciding cases”). 
 10. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35 (1999). 
 11. SCALIA, supra note 3, at vii. 
 12. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584–602 (1995) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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do. . . .”13 Originalism, according to its proponents, reduces judicial 
discretion and narrows the set of plausible outcomes. Even so, one 
substantial difficulty with originalism is that it cannot answer all legal 
queries. The original meaning of many constitutional provisions is 
unknown and the meaning of others is disputed.14 In addition, formal 
originalism may provide no window into statutory interpretation 
cases of first impression; perhaps this is why overlap exists between 
originalists and textualists. That said, if, as Judge Robert Bork 
suggests, principles of originalism can apply to statutory 
interpretation,15 then why would one rely on the meaning of the plain 
language of the text while rejecting any insight provided by the 
legislative history? 
B. Legislative History 
Other efforts to find meaning in legislation seek not only to 
determine what the words in a legal document mean, but also what 
the legislators who drafted the statute intended by the words. This 
approach is best characterized by a reliance on or use of legislative 
history. In practice, legislative history is a commonly used 
interpretive tool. 
Despite this, there remains continued disagreement among both 
judges and legal scholars about the legitimacy of its usage. Such 
disagreement has ebbed and flowed over the decades. In 1930, Max 
Radin claimed that there was “no general agreement” on the 
appropriate use of legislative history in statutory interpretation.16 
However, soon thereafter, most lawyers accepted the validity of 
legislative history.17 Jorge Carro and Andrew Brann, looking at 
 
 13. Jonathan Ewing, Scalia Dismisses “Living Constitution,” BREITBART.COM, Feb. 14, 
2006, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8FP4G40E&show_article=1.  
 14. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 88–95 (2004). 
 15. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION 
OF THE LAW 144–45 (1990).  
 16. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 872 (1930). 
 17. See Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. 
L. REV. 370, 380 (1947) (“Despite earlier doubts, committee reports, committee amendments, 
responsible explanations on the floor, and similar legislative materials may now be considered 
by a federal court interpreting a statute, even when the words, taken alone, have an 
unambiguous meaning.”); The Johnson Act: Defining a “Plain, Speedy, and Efficient Remedy 
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Supreme Court case law from 1938 to 1979, “detect[ed] a firm 
evolution that [went] from the almost absolute rejection of the use of 
legislative history in statutory interpretation to an almost absolute 
acceptance.”18  
But while legislative history is a common judicial tool, research 
indicates the rate of usage has declined, at least in the Supreme 
Court.19 Although legislative history has lost popularity since the 
Burger Court, it has been argued that Justice Scalia’s emergence on 
the Court “has not only blunted the growth of use of legislative 
history, but has led to its substantial decline,” further inhibiting its 
use since the 1980s and early 1990s.20 Scalia has continued his 
assault on legislative history. At his confirmation hearings, Scalia 
stated that if he “could create the world anew,” he would get rid of 
legislative history.21 Once on the Court, Scalia has at times refused to 
join sections or footnotes of majority opinions that deal with 
legislative history.22  
Meanwhile, Justice Breyer champions legislative history and 
argues that “history that shows what the language likely meant to 
those who wrote it” should be relevant to a judge’s inquiry with 
respect to a specific statute.23 He argues that consideration of the 
purpose of a statute “helps to implement the public’s will and is 
therefore consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose.”24  
 
in the State Courts, 50 HARV. L. REV. 813, 826 (1937) (“A few courts have forbidden the use of 
these materials, but the strong approval of a considerable body of authority now points to their 
free employability.”).  
 18. Jorge L. Carro & Andrew R. Brann, The U.S. Supreme Court and the Use of 
Legislative Histories: A Statistical Analysis, 22 JURIMETRICS J. 294, 296 (1982). 
 19. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History? 
Patterns of Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 JUDICATURE 220, 
220–21 (2006); Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative 
History: The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 386–87 (1999).  
 20. Koby, supra note 19, at 387, 395; see also Brudney & Ditslear, supra note 19, at 221. 
 21. Nomination of Judge Antonin Scalia, to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 105-06 (1986). 
 22. See, e.g., S.D. Warren Co. v. Me. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006); KP 
Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 113 (2004); Moseley v. 
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 420 (2003); Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 520 
U.S. 953, 955 (1997); United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 
213, 215 (1996). 
 23. BREYER, supra note 4, at 7.  
 24. Id. at 99. 
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C. How Interpretative Strategies Might Influence Outcomes 
Little research addresses the influence of interpretive strategies on 
judicial decision-making. While most research focuses on the 
question of whether use of interpretive strategies are, in themselves, 
evidence of the influence of the “legal,” some articles do consider the 
questions of how and why interpretive strategies might influence 
outcomes, or whether interpretive tools are post hoc justifications of 
prior-held desires for a particular disposition in a particular case.  
Professors Brudney and Ditslear, for example, study the use of 
legislative history in the U.S. Supreme Court, finding that such use 
has declined (as mentioned above) and that its use is not 
straightforwardly ideological.25 Indeed, while liberal Justices are 
more likely to invoke legislative intent than are conservatives, they 
do not predominantly reach liberal outcomes in doing so. Brudney 
and Ditslear suggest that, rather than ideology, the frequent use of 
legislative history might be an interpretive philosophy regarding the 
role of the Court and Congress.26 They argue that it moderates 
outcomes and may be a legitimizing influence for the Court.27  
Professors Gates and Phelps, on the other hand, consider the use 
of “intentionalism” in the decision-making of Justices Rehnquist (a 
proponent) and Brennan (an opponent), seeking to determine whether 
the invocation of the Framers was exclusive to one ideology and 
whether it was influential as to outcomes.28 They find that neither 
Brennan nor Rehnquist use the method often, that there is no large 
difference between the two in how often they use it or to what extent 
it is controlling (most often, it is not), and that each Justice uses the 
interpretive strategy to reach the outcome they personally prefer.29 In 
other words, while it is not often controlling and is not often invoked, 
when one of the two Justices used intentionalism in their opinions, 
they did so to reach their preferred policy outcome. Consistent with 
 
 25. Burdney & Ditslear, supra note 19, at 228–29. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. John B. Gates & Glenn A. Phelps, Intentionalism in Constitutional Opinions, 49 POL. 
RES. Q. 245 (1996). 
 29. Id. at 257. 
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an attitudinal model formulation,30 Gates and Phelps argue that the 
intent of the framers is a tool, enabling the Justices to reach the 
outcomes they prefer (at least these two Justices, for the decisions 
under study).31 
Finally, Professors Corley, Howard, and Nixon study use of The 
Federalist Papers, seeking to uncover the influence of the Papers 
(and hence, originalism) on outcomes as a pure legal influence on 
decision-making.32 They note an increase in citations to The 
Federalist Papers, which many take to be a sign that the Justices are 
relying more heavily on the intent of the Framers, a legalistic 
criterion.33 However, their research shows that references to The 
Federalist Papers, rather than being a constraint on ideological 
decision-making, facilitate it.34 Indeed, liberal Justices are far less 
likely to cite to The Federalist Papers than are conservative Justices, 
and all Justices are more likely to cite to them when in need of 
additional legitimacy (i.e., in close cases, in cases in which they 
declare legislation unconstitutional or overturn precedent, and in 
cases when separate opinions in the case also cite to them).35 In 
addition, they find that the rise in citations to The Federalist Papers 
over time is largely a result of increased dissensus on the Court.36 In 
short, the evidence suggests that legitimacy needs and ideology drive 
citations to this source of original intent, not a legally-driven search 
for authority or the “right” answer. 
In general, based on the studies discussed above and the 
conventional wisdom, as well as the prevalence of attitudinal 
expectations about judicial behavior, there is an expected relationship 
between interpretive strategy and ideology. Indeed, originalism is 
thought to be preferred by conservative jurists and rarely finds 
traction with more liberal judges and scholars.37 Though some 
 
 30. See JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002). 
 31. Gates & Phelps, supra note 28, at 257. 
 32. Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and 
Opinion Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RES. Q. 329 (2005). 
 33. Id. at 330. 
 34. Id. at 339. 
 35. Id. at 335–36. 
 36. Id. at 337–38. 
 37. But see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) 
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conservatives, such as Judge Posner, are not originalists,38 the 
movement is strongly aligned with the most conservative members of 
the judiciary. 
Justice Scalia, for example, relies on the writings of the Framers 
to “display how the text of the Constitution was originally 
understood.”39 Similarly, Justice Thomas has been known to cite The 
Federalist Papers “to show how far we have departed from the 
original understanding” of the United States Constitution.40 Judge 
Bork states “that judges must always be guided by the original 
understanding of the Constitution’s provisions. . . . [N]o set of 
propositions is too preposterous to be espoused by a judge or a law 
professor who has cast loose from the historical Constitution.”41 
Professor Cass Sunstein argues that Republican presidents have 
sought to appoint originalists to the federal bench; Scalia and Thomas 
(and Bork) fall squarely within this category.42 These originalist 
judges have been supported by the Conservative Right and belittled 
by the Liberal Left.43 
Many claim that adoption of originalism as an interpretive 
strategy reduces the discretion judges have, thereby curbing the 
influence of ideology on their votes.44 However, if originalism is 
statistically capable of increasing the probability of a conservative 
vote, discretion may not be taken from the judge; rather, conservative 
outcomes are more likely to result from originalist jurisprudence. On 
the other hand, invocations of originalism may be a choice and 
preference in favor of predictability and ease of decision-making 
regardless of ideological outcome.  
 
(rejecting the idea that the Constitution should be construed in accordance with the current 
times, and arguing that using amendments to change the meaning of the Constitution was “good 
for our Fathers, and being somewhat old fashioned I must add it is good enough for me”); Akhil 
Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term, Foreward: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 
Harv. L. Rev. 26 (2000).  
 38. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed. 2003). 
 39. SCALIA, supra note 3, at 38. 
 40. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 41. BORK, supra note 15, at 351–52. 
 42. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE 
WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005). 
 43. See MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: HOW THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING 
AMERICA (2005). 
 44. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 3, at 45–46. 
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Relatedly, legislative history may be expected to be negatively 
related to a conservative vote, it being a tool favored by more liberal 
jurists. Conservative jurists like Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook 
disfavor its use45 while Justice Breyer, for example, defends 
legislative history.46 Professors Eskridge and Frickey suggest that an 
ideological component exists in the use of legislative history as 
well.47 
All of this begs the question, which comes first? Is it that 
conservative jurists are expected to find originalism more seductive 
and liberals legislative history more persuasive? Or, are conservative 
outcomes more likely using originalism, liberal outcomes more likely 
using legislative history, and hence conservative and liberal justices 
choose them in order to reach their preferred outcomes? We attempt 
to shed some light on this question of causality as well as disentangle 
the effects of interpretation and ideology in the analysis below. 
II. DECISION-MAKING ON THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 
The U.S. Courts of Appeals, charged with offering to every losing 
federal defendant their one appeal, are ideal laboratories in which to 
carefully analyze the ways in which legal interpretive strategies affect 
decisions. Given the infrequency of Supreme Court review of Court 
of Appeals decisions, these courts are the final hope for most litigants 
in federal court, hearing over 98% of all federal appeals each year.48 
Scholarship that considers the influences on the decisions at this level 
of court, attempts to predict how any given case or statute will fare, 
tries to determine how much confidence we should have in these 
judgments, or examines the importance (or lack thereof) of the 
nominations and confirmations process to policy in the United States 
is, therefore, especially important. This is where policy-making in 
American federal courts occurs. Disentangling the effects of law and 
 
 45. Id. at 29–30; Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 441 (1990). 
 46. BREYER, supra note 4, at 85–101. 
 47. ESKRIDGE & FRICKEY, supra note 6, at 603–13. 
 48. DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE, CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 17 (2000). 
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ideology here promises to bring us closer to knowing what drives 
decisions at this important level.  
In the Courts of Appeals, due to their institutional position, the 
role of ideology is likely tempered, and law might have a more 
substantial effect on decision-making.49 Such intermediate-level 
courts, understood to be subservient to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
should be bound by Supreme Court precedent.50 Additionally, given 
the circuit courts’ lack of docket control, “law” should matter more 
here. With the large number of “easy” cases these courts hear and the 
heavy caseload they bear, deference to the lower courts is rampant 
and disagreement among judges rare.51 Unlike the U.S. Supreme 
Court, whose Justices fill its docket with hand-picked legally-
challenging or ideologically-salient cases, basic legal interpretive 
strategies will likely have greater impact in the less dynamic, 
aggregate caseload of the Courts of Appeals. Thus, legal interpretive 
strategies may expeditiously resolve the conflicts with which this 
level of court deals (even if this is not necessarily the case at the 
Supreme Court level).52  
 
 49. See DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 
(2002); Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. REV. 
1457 (2003); Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s Chain 
Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156 (2005). 
 50. See SARA C. BENESH, THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS AND THE LAW OF CONFESSIONS: 
PERSPECTIVES ON THE HIERARCHY OF JUSTICE (2002); Donald Songer, Jeffrey A. Segal & 
Charles Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme 
Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673 (1994). 
 51. See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L. MARTINEK, 
JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISION MAKING 
110, 117 (2006); Cross, supra note 49; Erin B. Kaheny, Susan Brodie Haire & Sara C. Benesh, 
Change over Tenure: Voting, Variance, and Decision Making on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 52 
AM. J. POL. SCI. 490 (2008). According to the Songer Database and its update, both of which 
are random samples by circuit by year, between 1925 and 2002, about 88% of the decisions 
made in the circuit courts were unanimous (i.e., they had neither concurring nor dissenting 
opinions attached). See Appeals Court Data, http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/appctdata.htm 
(follow “Original Appeals Court Database (1925–1996)” and “Update to Appeals Court 
Database (1997–2002)” hyperlinks) (last visited Apr. 8, 2009); Ashlyn K. Kuersten & Susan B. 
Haire, Update to the Appeals Court Database (2007), http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/juri/ 
appctdata.htm.  
 52. See Howard & Segal, supra note 1. Our focus on the Seventh Circuit in particular is 
pragmatic; it is the only one for which career usage scores over interpretative strategies are 
available. 
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III. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A. Data 
Are legal interpretive strategies purely legal, or are they driven—
in part—by desired ideological outcome? Judge Easterbrook 
maintains, with respect to a text-based interpretive strategy, that, “If 
the textualist is interpreting laws written in a more conservative era, 
the results will appear ‘conservative’ to modern eyes. . . . When the 
text is to the left of today’s consensus, textualism produces results 
that are politically ‘liberal.’”53 Is this confirmed in empirical 
analysis? 
In order to test the effects of legal interpretation, all non-
unanimous decisions54 made by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit from the 1997 term through the 2003 term in the 
areas of criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due 
process, and privacy were coded for the ideological direction of their 
outcomes.55 Using judge vote as the unit of analysis and direction of 
vote (as coded in the Songer database)56 as the dependent variable, 
this project seeks to determine whether modes of legal interpretation 
(coded as career usage scores for each individual judge’s invocation 
of originalism and legislative history as tools of interpretation), after 
 
 53. Easterbrook, supra note 45, at 50. 
 54. Non-unanimous cases are those eliciting either a dissenting opinion or a concurrence 
from one of the judges on the three-judge panel. Scholars have shown that unanimous cases can 
mask disagreement among judges and may sometimes give the misleading impression that a 
particular case is “easy.” While there are certainly exceptions, perhaps where a collegial judge 
defers to his or her more interested colleagues, many unanimous cases are easy (or at least 
easier than the non-unanimous cases), either because the outcomes are resolved by precedent or 
because the judges’ policy preferences on the issue are similar. We use only nonconsensual 
cases in order to give ideology an opportunity to exert some influence, making our test of 
ideology versus legal interpretation a more rigorous one. Pragmatically, the data we use were 
collected for another project on coalitions, hence the lack of interest in unanimous decisions. 
 55. The project is limited to these issue areas because in other areas it is not possible to 
define a liberal or conservative outcome. Cases heard en banc, panel decisions vacated on 
rehearing, dissents from anything but the majority opinion (dissents from denials of rehearing, 
denials of rehearing en banc, and petitions for rehearing or stay), or cases in which Judge Jesse 
Eschbach participated (because there were so few) are excluded. Songer’s coding helps 
determine whether outcomes are ideologically liberal or conservative. See Songer, supra note 
51.  
 56. Id. 
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controlling for ideology (measured by career liberalism scores 
compiled from the Songer database), predict the decision.  
B. Model of Decision-Making 
This section describes how the model’s variables are 
operationalized, including measures of the use of legal interpretative 
strategies, measures of ideology, and controls for lower court 
direction and liberalism of the Supreme Court in the term previous to 
the decision. It treats each in turn. 
1. Modes of Legal Interpretation 
The measures for modes of legal interpretation are derived from 
the research of law professors Jason Czarnezki and William Ford.57 
Czarnezki and Ford (and their research assistants) coded every 
opinion (majority, dissent, concurrence, and dubitante)58 written by 
sixteen current and former judges on the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals over the course of their careers (excluding those cases here 
under study) for the use of various modes of legal interpretation.59 
Difficulties arise in measuring the “law,” especially in determining 
how best to code cases for reliance on various strategies of legal 
interpretation. The Czarnezki and Ford strategy considered judicial 
use of interpretive documents and phrases as evidenced by reliance 
upon them in opinions written by individual judges. This provided a 
proxy for the use of interpretive strategies overall. This Article 
specifically considers originalism (interpreting the Constitution in 
light of the meaning as understood at the time of drafting) and 
legislative history (the use of committee reports, floor speeches, or 
other tools to discern what legislators meant when they wrote specific 
words into statutes). Is reliance on such interpretive tools 
ideologically motivated, or separately determinative of outcomes? 
 
 57. Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 1. 
 58. A dubitante opinion is written when a judge desires to express reservations about the 
majority’s conclusion, but does not deem his or her reservations to rise to a level justifying a 
concurring or dissenting opinion. See Jason J. Czarnezki, The Dubitante Opinion, 39 AKRON L. 
REV. 1 (2006). 
 59. Czarnezki & Ford, supra note 1, at 856–57. 
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In order to code for each interpretive strategy, Czarnezki and Ford 
use LEXIS searches coupled with extensive content analysis in order 
to differentiate between frequent mention of such tools and real 
reliance upon them in decision-making.60 Their “filtered” career 
scores, which compute the percentage of a given judge’s written 
opinions that rely on a particular tool, prove most valuable. In order 
to be included in this “reliance” category, a judge had to have used 
the interpretive tool to interpret a statute or constitutional provision. 
In other words, the judge needed to have positively relied on the tool 
in his or her legal analysis of the case, not merely mentioned it.61 In 
this Article, these scores are used as a measure of how a given judge 
legally approaches a case. The Article then explores the impact of the 
judge’s legal philosophy on his or her vote in a given case.  
However, given the anticipated role of ideology in the career 
usage scores of the judges, the career usage scores are first purged of 
the impact of ideology by regressing career ideology score on the 
career usage scores for both originalism and legislative history. The 
saved residuals are then used as measures of the frequency of usage 
in the model of judge votes. Hence, the measures of originalism and 
of legislative history can be said to have been “cleaned” of the 
influence of the career liberalism score of each judge and therefore 
independent from ideology.62  
 
 60. The LEXIS searches were as follows: the original meaning of the Constitution 
((“original understanding” or “original intent” or “originalism” or “original meaning” or 
ratifie!) /10 (constitution! or amendment or clause)), or (Federalist or “founding fathers” or 
“constitutional convention”), or (framers /5 constitution! or amendment or clause); legislative 
history (“legislative history” or “committee report” or “U.S.C.C.A.N.” or “floor debate” or 
“committee statement” or “committee hearing” or “legislative counsel” or “H.R.” or “S.J. Res.” 
or “Cong. Rec.” or “S. Res.” or “H.R.J. Res.” or “S. Doc. No.” or “S. Rep.”). Czarnezki & 
Ford, supra note 1, at 862 n.95.  
 61. Id. at 876. 
 62. The result of those regressions are as follows (standard errors in parentheses): Leghist 
= 3.51 (0.25) + 19.47 (1.06) Career Ideology + e. Career ideology is highly significant and 
signed such that as liberalism increases, the extent to which the judge uses legislative history 
also increases. Originalism = 0.186 (0.027) + 0.75 (0.114) Career Ideology + e. Again, career 
ideology is significant, but much less influential (as seen by the coefficient) and in the opposite 
direction as one might posit; as liberalism goes up, the career originalism score goes up.  
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2. Ideology 
In order to control for what most scholars have found to be at least 
somewhat influential, the model includes a measure of judge 
ideology, created to comport with the legal interpretative scores. As 
those scores are career scores and, as noted above, are employed as 
measures of the way in which a judge legally approaches a given 
case, a measure for ideology that approximates a career score is 
included as well, measuring the ideological approach favored by a 
given judge. In order to calculate this measure, the Songer Database 
is used, from which the percentage of cases voted on by each judge in 
an ideologically liberal direction over the course of those votes from 
his or her career captured in the Songer data are calculated.63 The 
measure, then, should decrease the likelihood that a conservative vote 
will be reached; as the judge’s liberalism increases, any given case 
she decides should be less likely to be conservative in nature, 
especially since unanimous decisions are excluded, as noted above. 
Other measures of ideology are measured at the individual level, 
rather than the career level, and while they might help predict the 
likelihood of a conservative vote in a given case, they tap into 
different considerations (e.g., nominations and confirmations) than 
does a score based on career voting.64 
 
 63. The Songer data is a sample by circuit, so some judges have more votes than others 
and the measure does not consider every vote cast by any of the judges in the Seventh Circuit. It 
should, however, approximate the average as the sample is random. Songer, supra note 51. 
 64. An appointment-based measure of ideology is popular in the research analyzing 
circuit court decision-making; however, the influence of that measure is also estimated. The 
most widely-used score based on the appointment derives from Michael W. Giles, Virginia A. 
Hettinger & Todd Peppers, Picking Federal Judges: A Note on Policy and Partisan Selection 
Agendas, 54 POL. RES. Q. 623 (2001). Their measure, based on Poole and Rosenthal’s 
NOMINATE scores for the President when sentorial courtesy does not operate and for the 
home state Senator(s) when senatorial courtesy does operate ranges from -1 (most liberal) to +1 
(most conservative). See KEITH T. POOLE & HOWARD ROSENTHAL, CONGRESS: A POLITICAL-
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROLL CALL VOTING (1997); Keith T. Poole, Recovering a Basic Space 
from a Set of Issue Scales, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 954 (1998). See infra note 67 for the findings 
when employing the “GHP” scores, rather than career liberalism. 
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3. Control Variables 
Finally, control variables must be added. These controls include, 
first, the directionality of the lower court in recognition that the 
Courts of Appeals are highly deferential to the lower court’s decision. 
This is both legally and contextually defensible. Legally, there are 
standards of review that require deference to the lower court’s 
determination of the facts at issue. Contextually, because the Court of 
Appeals has a mandatory docket, they will arguably receive many 
factually-resolvable cases (i.e., “easy” cases). For that reason, the 
Court of Appeals should often defer to the lower court’s decision for 
both legal and merit-related reasons.65 
In addition to deference to the lower court, much research has 
suggested that the Courts of Appeals defer to the Supreme Court.66 In 
order to control for the potential influence of the U.S. Supreme Court 
on decision-making by its subordinates, a measure of the Supreme 
Court’s overall liberalism in the term prior to the one at issue in the 
circuit court case is also included (since the Court, if it has an impact, 
can only have that impact after it has made its decision). 
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
TABLE 1: INFLUENCE OF LEGAL INTERPRETIVE STRATEGIES ON 
IDEOLOGICAL OUTCOMES 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error Sig Levela
Originalism  2.28 0.58 0.00
Legislative History -0.09 0.06 0.06
Career Liberalism 1.32 1.12 0.12
Lower Court Liberal -1.19 0.22 0.00
Supreme Court Liberalism -1.96 2.38 0.21
Constant  2.14 1.10 0.05
a All significance levels are for one-tailed tests. 
Dependent Variable: 1 = conservative vote, 0 = liberal vote 
N=476. Model Fit: Wald chi2 = 45.97, prob > chi2 = 0.00; pseudo R2 = 0.10; Area 
under ROC = 0.72; PRE = 7.88% 
 
 65. Of course, given the focus only on non-unanimous cases, such deference may be less 
notable than in other studies that include unanimous decisions as well. 
 66. See BENESH, supra note 50; Songer, Segal & Cameron, supra note 50.  
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The results of our primary analysis can be seen in Table 1. Using 
one-tailed tests, we find that as career usage of legislative history 
scores increases, a judge is less likely to vote conservatively in any 
given case, though the significance of the variable does not quite 
reach the conventional p<0.05 standard (as seen in the table, p<0.06 
for this variable). In addition, and as expected, as career usage of 
originalism increases, a judge is more likely to vote conservatively in 
any given case. It is also the case that, when the lower court reached a 
liberal outcome, the circuit judge is less likely to vote conservatively 
(and hence more likely to uphold the lower court’s liberal vote). 
Finally, neither career liberalism nor Supreme Court liberalism has a 
significant impact on the vote. Career liberalism is actually in the 
opposite direction as that suggested by the research.67 In terms of 
predicted probabilities, compared to the situation in which all 
variables are held at their respective means, a one-standard-deviation 
increase in use of legislative history makes a conservative outcome 
3.5% less likely, while a one-standard-deviation increase in use of 
originalism makes a conservative outcome 8.2% more likely. A case 
decided liberally in the lower court is 15.6% less likely to be decided 
conservatively by the circuit; a case decided conservatively by the 
lower court is 7.7% more likely to be decided conservatively.68 
 
 67. “GHP” scores perform similarly; they do not reach standard levels of significance and 
are incorrectly signed. Using them to purge ideology from the interpretive measures also results 
in strikingly similar results. The model fit is worse using GHP scores, but nothing else 
appreciably changes. Hence, because the legal interpretation scores are measured as career 
scores, the career liberalism scores are preferable. 
 68. The predicted probability of a conservative vote is 0.753 when all variables are at their 
respective means. 
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TABLE 2: INFLUENCE OF LEGAL INTERPRETIVE STRATEGIES ON 
IDEOLOGICAL OUTCOMES FOR LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE JUDGES 
Liberal Judges Only 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error Sig Levela 
Originalism  -1.78 1.04 0.09 
Legislative History -0.54 0.17 0.00 
Career Liberalism -40.92 11.18 0.00 
Lower Court Liberal -0.62 0.44 0.08 
Supreme Court Liberalism 4.65 6.04 0.22 
Constant  12.67 4.27 0.00 
 
Conservative Judges Only 
   
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error Sig Levela 
Originalism  4.90 1.09 0.00 
Legislative History -0.05 0.07 0.23 
Career Liberalism -1.93 1.82 0.15 
Lower Court Liberal -1.47 0.27 0.00 
Supreme Court Liberalism -3.32 2.78 0.12 
Constant 3.43 1.31 0.01 
a All significance levels are for one-tailed tests except for originalism for liberal 
judges, as it is wrongly signed. 
Dependent Variable: 1 = conservative vote, 0 = liberal vote 
Liberal Judges: N=145. Model Fit: Wald chi2 = 19.51, prob > chi2 = 0.00; pseudo 
R2 = 0.15; Area under ROC=0.76; PRE = 9.5%. Conservative Judges: N=331. 
Model Fit: Wald chi2 = 54.81, prob > chi2 = 0.00; pseudo R2 = 0.1523; Area under 
ROC= 0.76; PRE = 8.17%. 
It remains unclear, however, whether liberal and conservative 
judges might still behave distinctively when it comes to employing 
either legislative history or originalism as a tool to better understand 
texts. As noted above, in the regressions purging ideology from the 
career interpretive scores, the former was significantly related to the 
latter. Indeed, it is also true that career originalism predicts career 
ideology fairly well, as does career legislative history use. Again, 
though, both are positive (originalism would be expected to be 
negative) and statistically significant, though their coefficients are 
much smaller than the coefficient on ideology in the regressions on 
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the interpretive scores.69 This provides some indication that liberal 
and conservative judges are different in terms of their reliance on 
these tools and the ideological connection they may have with them. 
Table 2 presents results of two models attempting to test that notion. 
Defining “liberal” as those judges with a career liberalism score of 
more than 0.25,70 the table demonstrates that there are clear 
differences across judges in the relationship between use of 
interpretive strategy, ideology, and a given vote in a given case. The 
“liberal” judges are far more influenced by ideology and their use of 
a tool always decreases the likelihood of a conservative vote. These 
judges appear to use the tools to their ideological advantage; they 
employ the tools to reach liberal outcomes. The conservative judges, 
on the other hand, enhance the likelihood of a conservative vote when 
they use originalism and decrease that likelihood when they rely on 
legislative history (though not to a statistically significant degree in 
the latter case). Ideology works in the expected direction, though it 
does not attain conventional levels of statistical significance. This 
suggests that judges employ tools differentially and that, perhaps, 
liberal judges are more ideological than conservative judges.71 
CONCLUSION 
It is indeed the case that judges who invoke originalism frequently 
in their opinions vote more conservatively in this set of cases. In 
addition, judges who frequently cite legislative history are more 
likely to vote liberally. Does this mean that judges are using legal 
interpretive tools strategically in order to advance their preferred 
resolution of a case? Maybe so, especially given the findings from the 
regression focusing on liberal justices only. Does it mean that 
 
 69. The results of those regressions are (standard errors in parentheses): Career Liberalism 
= 0.182 (0.007) + 0.11 (0.017)Originalism + e; Career Liberalism = 0.055 (0.01) + 0.021 
(0.001)Legislative History + e. 
 70. The range of liberalism score was 0 to 0.50. A score of 0.25 or greater included the 
top 30% of liberal voting judges. 
 71. Of course, caution should be used in attributing too much to these findings. Labeling a 
judge as “liberal” because the judge voted in a liberal direction in more than 25% of the cases 
decided over the course of his or her career is a fairly low threshold for liberalism. However, 
using the GHP scores as the liberal/conservative cutoff, similar findings emerge, though some 
signs switch on the insignificant variables (Liberal = GHP > 0.). 
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conservatives tend to be more convinced by originalist interpretations 
and hence employ them more often? Possibly. Does this evidence 
show definitely which comes first—the decision or the rationale? It 
does not, as bivariate regressions testing the influence of career 
ideology on career tool usage and vice versa both produce significant 
coefficients. However, the analysis here does show that at least some 
attempts to justify a particular version of “the best way in which to 
interpret the Constitution or a statute” by using terms that suggest its 
neutrality may be disingenuous or post hoc rationalizations of 
ideological decisions.72 
Why does this matter? Many have argued that the legitimacy of 
the Supreme Court stems in part from citizen beliefs that they decide 
cases in an impartial, non-ideological way. The use of interpretive 
strategies attempts to perpetuate that belief, with Scalia arguing that 
such reliance eliminates much of the room to politically maneuver in 
decision-making on the Court. This Article—as well as others 
exploring similar relationships at the Supreme Court level—casts 
some doubt on those claims, doubt that is supported by common-
sense notions about the difficulty in discerning the intent either of the 
Framers or of legislators, especially due to lack of collective intent 
and lack of accurate descriptions of motivations. Judicial opinions, 
normatively, attempt to justify the decision made by the court or by 
the judge with evidence legitimizing that outcome. Perhaps some 
evidence is selected with the preferred outcome already in mind.  
 
 72. Of course, the reader should recognize that not all cases in the dataset would be 
affected by originalism or legislative history, and there may be other legal influences on 
decisions in those cases not captured by the model. It should also be noted that we consider a 
limited dataset in this Article. 
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